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Spinoza’s Ontology Geometrically Illustrated: 
A Reading of Ethics IIP8S
Valtteri Viljanen
The Ethics is probably the most famous and finest example of a philosophical trea-
tise written in the synthetic geometrical style in which propositions are derived 
from basic definitions and axioms. This alone leaves little doubt that, for Spinoza, 
geometry provides the pivotal model for philosophy. However, we should not 
rush into thinking that a certain form of exposition is the only, or even the most 
important, sense in which geometry informs his philosophy; there are reasons 
to think that geometricity is ingrained deeper than that in his thought. Most 
notably, Spinoza’s penchant for geometrical examples to illustrate key points of 
his system signals this. Perhaps the best-known instance of this is the following:
I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16) that from God’s supreme power, 
or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., all 
things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in 
the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to 
eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. (E IP17S)1
In other words, all things as modifications of the single substance follow from the 
nature (or essence) of that substance, precisely in the way that certain necessary 
properties follow from the essence of a geometrical figure such as a triangle. This 
arresting claim is in line with and, I think, the source of Spinoza’s no less striking 
necessitarianism, according to which nothing could have been otherwise since 
everything takes place with absolute necessity.2
In addition to the example concerning (the essence of) a triangle and its prop-
erties, I would like to draw attention to three especially prominent illustrations. 
To take the earliest first, in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Spinoza 
sets two requirements for a proper definition (of the essence of a finite thing).3 
Here is the first:
The definition . . . will have to include the proximate cause. E.g., according 
to this law, a circle would have to be defined as follows: it is the figure that is 
described by any line of which one end is fixed and the other movable. The 
definition clearly includes the proximate cause. (TIE 96)
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In other words, a thing can only be properly defined – and thereby understood 
– genetically, with geometry showing how this is to be done. The second require-
ment reads as follows:
We require a concept, or definition, of the thing such that when it is consid-
ered alone, without any others conjoined, all the thing’s properties can be 
deduced from it (as may be seen in this definition of the circle). For from it we 
clearly infer that all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are 
equal. (TIE 96)
These two passages are based on the following line of thought: every genuine 
thing has a definable essence (that constitutes the thing, makes it the thing it 
is),4 that essence comes to be generated in a certain way (which is reflected by the 
first requirement), and from it certain properties necessarily follow (the second 
requirement latches on to this). All this may – and I think should – be taken to 
reveal Spinoza’s general way of thinking about the fundamental inner structure 
of all finite things, and, quite characteristically, Spinoza opts for geometrical 
illustrations to drive his point home.
The second famous example – interestingly in line with the two requirements 
just mentioned – concerns the way in which our emotions (or affects) have
certain causes, through which they are understood, and have certain prop-
erties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing . . . 
Therefore, I shall treat the nature and powers of the Affects, and the power of 
the Mind over them, by the same Method by which, in the preceding parts, I 
treated God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites 
just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies. (E IIIPref.)
To consider human emotions and actions ‘just as if it were a Question of lines, 
planes, and bodies’ may make one think of a mechanistic approach;5 but since the 
beginning of the passage refers to causes and properties (which, as we have seen, 
Spinoza thinks in geometrical terms) and the method is said to be the same as that 
which Spinoza has applied to God (and thus hardly in any sense ‘mechanistic’), it 
seems evident that he is proclaiming that we are to understand what we feel and 
do in the same way we understand geometrical objects and their properties.6
The third significant geometrical illustration is located in IIP8S of the Ethics. 
In this chapter, I offer an in-depth reading of that illustration and show how it 
can be used to explicate the whole architecture of Spinoza’s system by specifying 
the way in which all the key structural features of his basic ontology find their 
analogies in the example. The illustration can also throw light on Spinoza’s 
ontology of finite things and inform us about what is at stake when we form 
universal ideas. In general, my reading of E IIP8S thus elucidates what it means, 
for Spinoza, to think geometrically or to consider geometry as a model: funda-
mentally, geometricity is not a form of exposition but the way in which reality 
itself is structured.
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The Illustration and its Background
As our main geometrical example is designed to illustrate E IIP8 and its corollary, 
they should be quoted in full. Here is the proposition itself:
The ideas of singular things, or of modes, that do not exist must be compre-
hended in God’s infinite idea in the same way as the formal essences of the 
singular things, or modes, are contained in God’s attributes. (E IIP8)
The demonstration is brief in the extreme: ‘This proposition is evident from 
the preceding one [IIP7], but is understood more clearly from the preceding 
scholium.’ E IIP7, in turn, presents what has come to be called Spinoza’s parallel-
ism: ‘The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection 
of things.’ Discussing this proposition, as difficult as it is central, would take us 
too far afield; we must simply note that we are indeed in deep Spinozistic waters 
and move on to the corollary of E IIP8:
From this it follows that so long as singular things do not exist, except insofar 
as they are comprehended in God’s attributes, their objective being, or ideas, 
do not exist except insofar as God’s infinite idea exists. And when singular 
things are said to exist, not only insofar as they are comprehended in God’s 
attributes, but insofar also as they are said to have duration, their ideas also 
involve the existence through which they are said to have duration. (E IIP8C)
The proposition and its corollary have been the subject of a prolonged discus-
sion,7 but I think it is safe to make two main points here, one being ontological, 
the other epistemological. The ontological point is that formal essences are 
atemporally contained in their attributes; the epistemological point is that this 
enables us to have adequate ideas of non-existing things, that is, of things that 
are not actual at the moment.
The key illustration reads as follows:
If anyone wishes me to explain this further by an example, I will, of course, 
not be able to give one which adequately explains what I speak of here, since 
it is unique. Still I shall try as far as possible to illustrate the matter: the 
circle is of such a nature that the rectangles formed from the segments of all 
the straight lines intersecting in it are equal to one another. So in a circle 
there are contained infinitely many rectangles that are equal to one another. 
Nevertheless, none of them can be said to exist except insofar as the circle 
exists, nor also can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist except 
insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Now of these infinitely 
many [rectangles] let two only, viz. [those formed from the segments of lines] 
D and E, exist. Of course their ideas also exist now, not only insofar as they are 
only comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve 
the existence of those rectangles. By this they are distinguished from the other 
ideas of the other rectangles. (E IIP8S)
LORD 9781474420433 PRINT.indd   7 15/12/2017   15:16
8 Valtteri Viljanen
The background of the illustration is not difficult to discern: it is in fact proposi-
tion 35 of the third part of Euclid’s Elements:
If in a circle two straight lines cut one another, then the rectangle contained by the 
segments of the one equals the rectangle contained by the segments of the other.
 For in the circle ABCD let the two straight lines AC and BD cut one 
another at the point E. I say that the rectangle AE by EC equals the rectangle 
DE by EB. (Euclid 1908: 71)
For our purposes there is no need to go into Euclid’s lengthy demonstration 
of the proposition. It suffices to note that we can derive an infinite number of 
rectangle pairs by drawing intersecting lines in a circle and that the resulting 
rectangles are always equal (that is, AE × EC = DE × EB). To connect this 
to Spinoza’s epistemological concerns, there is nothing preventing us having 
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reflects an important idea that Spinoza voices in a forceful manner early in his 
philosophical career:
If some architect conceives a building in an orderly fashion, then although 
such a building never existed, and even never will exist, still the thought of it is 
true, and the thought is the same, whether the building exists or not. (TIE 69)
Spinoza arguably finds Euclid’s proposition particularly apt for illustrating that we 
can form an adequate idea of whatever can be construed ‘in an orderly fashion’ – 
for this, the actual (durational) existence of the object is simply irrelevant.
Monistic Ontology and the Geometrical Illustration
The epistemological point is certainly noteworthy; it is, after all, what Spinoza 
ostensibly wants to convey with the example. But we can go further and show 
how deeply entrenched the illustration is in Spinoza’s system, which bestows 
upon it explicatory force of a completely different level. The illustration is built 
on a specific geometric architecture. And that architecture – when given a slight 
interpretative twist – captures strikingly faithfully the basic structural features of 
Spinoza’s whole ontology. I assume that Spinoza himself was at least partly aware 
of this, for it is, in the end, clear that the illustration contains many central 
elements of his ontology. But let us consider this again when I have presented 
my case.
From the Infinite to the Finite
The single substance, the monistic God-or-Nature without which ‘nothing can 
be or be conceived’ (E IP15), is of course the most basic element in Spinoza’s 
ontology. We have seen that, for Spinoza (as for so much of the Western phil-
osophical tradition), any genuine thing is endowed with its essence, that which 
makes it the thing it is. This is no less true of the absolutely infinite substance 
than it is of finite things. Spinoza calls that which constitutes the essence of sub-
stance an attribute.8 A substance can have many attributes (E IP9), each infinite 
‘in its own kind’ (E ID6), but there cannot be an attributeless substance, only, 
for instance, substance as thinking or substance as extended. In our illustration, 
the circle clearly represents an attribute: after all, the scholium is supposed to help 
us understand how essences of singular things are contained in their attribute, so 
the circle as the starting point of the illustration represents the latter.9 We know 
only two attributes,10 thought and extension, and can thus regard the circle as the 
thinking substance or the extended substance.
What about the lines from which rectangles are formed? Spinoza says that 
the rectangles are comprehended or contained in the circle, but it is not imme-
diately clear what this means. The following claim by Charlie Huenemann is, 
I believe, helpfully correct: ‘[W]hen X geometrically contains Y, it means that 
X has sufficient features for producing Y, in accordance with sanctioned means 
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of construction.’11 To give an example of this, recall how Spinoza describes the 
production of a sphere (in TIE 96). I believe he would approve of the following 
method of constructing it from extension: first move a point rectilinearly (in 
extension), then rotate the resulting line by holding its one end fixed and moving 
the other.12 In line with this, it is important to note how central motion is for the 
Spinozistic extended substance:
In examining natural things we strive to investigate first the things most univer-
sal and common to the whole of nature: motion and rest, and their laws and rules, 
which nature always observes and through which it continuously acts. From 
these we proceed gradually to other, less universal things. (TTP ch. 7/G III 
102, emphases added)
In other words, extended God-or-Nature produces everything ‘less universal’ – 
including rocks, trees, dogs, and human bodies – through law-obeying motion. This 
contention is completely consistent with Spinoza’s doctrine of infinite modes, or 
modes that ‘follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes’ and ‘have 
always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and 
infinite’ (E IP21).13 In his correspondence, Spinoza tells us that the immediate 
infinite mode – the mode most directly rooted in its attribute – of extension 
is motion and rest (Ep. 64 to Schuller).14 And the early Short Treatise explains 
that ‘each and every particular thing that comes to exist becomes such through 
motion and rest’ (KV II.Pref.), which all amounts to the claim that extended 
substance produces particular corporeal things through its infinite immediate 
mode, namely motion and rest.15 Thus, I think it is well warranted to say that the 
immediate infinite mode is the fundamental mode of generation or production 
within its attribute, and that in the extended substance this mode is lawful 
motion (and rest).16
Given the aforesaid, when Spinoza says that ‘the circle is of such a nature’ that 
‘from the segments of all the straight lines’ are formed rectangles (E IIP8S), he is 
illustrating the ontological thesis that particular things of any given substantial 
attribute (such as extension) come to be produced through its immediate infinite 
mode (such as lawful motion). We can thus say that the drawing of the lines 
corresponds to the basic mode of production within the attribute. To put the point 
colloquially, it is by ‘doing’ motion (in the attribute of extension) or thinking 
(in the attribute of thought) that Spinoza’s God-or-Nature produces finite bodies 
and ideas.
An infinite number of lines can be drawn inside a circle so that in it ‘there are 
contained infinitely many rectangles that are equal to one another’ (E IIP8S). 
We can next focus on an evident element of the illustration that Spinoza does 
not himself mention: each pair of lines determines or generates a cutting point.17 
Here it is helpful to recall how, according to TIE 96, a definition must state the 
‘proximate cause’ that produces the essence; in the illustration, each pair of lines 
primarily results in a cutting point, which can thus quite naturally be viewed as 
an essence that constitutes a particular finite thing.18 The scholium is silent both 
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about cutting points and essences, but the proposition itself is not: ‘the formal 
essences [essentiae formales] of the singular things, or modes, are contained in 
God’s attributes’ (E IIP8). The reference to essences is understandable due to 
their pivotal role in Spinoza’s system; moreover, given that the epistemological 
point of the proposition concerns the atemporal objects of knowledge, it is com-
pletely appropriate to refer more precisely to formal essences. Already the early 
Metaphysical Thoughts informs us that ‘the formal essence . . . depends on the 
divine essence alone, in which all things are contained. So in this sense we agree 
with those who say that the essences of things are eternal’ (CM I.2). This is not 
the place for a prolonged discussion of Spinoza’s essentialism; it suffices to note 
that atemporal formal essences are to be contrasted to actual essences and that 
there are good grounds to consider the former ontologically prior to the latter.19 
Now, Spinozistic particular things are specific, limited ways in which the attribute 
becomes modified, essences operating as what I would call attribute modifiers that 
constitute those things.20 Spinoza’s geometrical example can help us to grasp the 
way in which he views the relationship between attributes, immediate infinite 
modes, and the essences of finite modes: just as line-drawing is the feature of the 
circle through which are produced specific cutting points, immediate infinite 
modes (such as motion and rest or infinite intellection) of attributes (such as 
extension or thought) are the basis for the production of formal essences. These 
essences, in turn, are manifested differently under different attributes, resulting 
in such entities as minds and bodies. The so-called Physical Digression of the 
second part of the Ethics indicates that in extension the (formal) essence of a 
body involves a certain ratio of motion and rest (E IIA20D); the case of thought is 
more conjectural, but I would suggest that the formal essence of a mind involves 
a specific form of affirmation through which objects are conceived.21
In addition to the immediate infinite modes, there is one more infinite element 
in Spinoza’s ontology, usually called mediate infinite modes.22 When asked for an 
example of them, Spinoza famously gives ‘the face of the whole universe’ (Ep. 64 
to Schuller). This claim is often taken as referring exclusively to extended sub-
stance, though it might be intended as attribute-neutral.23 In any case, I believe 
the geometrical example can accommodate this idea as well: drawing an infinite 
number of lines yields an infinite number of cutting points, which can be viewed 
as an infinite whole (of points), just as the face of the whole (mental or physical) 
universe can be viewed as an infinite whole of formal essences. In this way, the 
infinite totality of all the cutting points can be used to illustrate the face of the 
whole physical or mental universe, or mediate infinite modes of their respective 
attributes.24 Thereby we have been able to place, proceeding from the infinite to 
the finite, all the fundamental elements of Spinoza’s ontology in one geometrical 
illustration lifted from Euclid’s Elements.
The Ontology of Finite Things
We can now begin discussing, in terms of the illustration, the ontology of finite 
things. Recall the two requirements for a definition of a finite thing (TIE 96): the 
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definition must designate how the thing is to be generated and what necessary 
properties it has. In the illustration, we can define a cutting point by stating 
that 1) it is produced by drawing two lines that intersect each other in a circle 
and that 2) thereby is set a platform from which other specific properties, such 
as rectangles of equal area, follow. For instance, a point x can be produced by 
drawing two lines so that two pairs of segments result, each segment having the 
length of 600 units, thus resulting in equal rectangles the area of which is 360,000 
square units.
Let us then draw another point, y, whose segment pairs are both of the length 
615 and 584, with the rectangles of 359,160 square units. Points x and y are thus 
very close to each other but still different in an exactly definable way – the mode 
of generation has been slightly different, with respectively different segments 
and rectangles. The circle contains an infinite number of points with their cor-
responding pairs of segments with different lengths; they form a continuum in 
which each point is nevertheless individual and expressible in an exact manner. 
I believe that all this applies to Spinoza’s formal essences: they are all individual 
despite the fact that the basic mode of production is the same in each case (it is 
only varied in each case), and given that there is an infinite number of them, the 
points form a continuum in which each individual occupies an exact position, 
capturable by the individual’s proper definition.25 This illustrates quite accurately 
what Spinoza says in the Short Treatise:
[A]ll and only the particulars have a cause, not the universals, because they 
are nothing.
 God, then, is a cause of, and provider for, only particular things. So if particular 
things have to agree with another nature, they will not be able to agree with 
their own, and consequently will not be able to be what they truly are. E.g., if 
God had created all men like Adam was before the fall, then he would have 
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gives all things their essence, from the least to the greatest; or to put it better, he has 
everything perfect in himself. (KV I.6, emphases added)
This, together with Spinoza’s famous contention that ‘I say that to the essence 
of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is [NS: also] necessarily 
posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily [NS: also] taken 
away; or that without which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and 
which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing’ (E IID2), gives us good 
reason to think that finite individuals are endowed with essences unique to their 
possessors.26 As depicted above, the illustration can throw light on why and how 
he thinks like this.
We have seen that things are more than their essences, for certain properties 
follow from any essence.27 Properties ‘common to all bodies’ (E IIP38Dem.) are 
famously important for Spinoza’s epistemological concerns, for what he calls 
‘reason and the second kind of knowledge’ (E IIP40S2) is based on them. This 
type of property – common to all finite things of a given attribute – can also be 
expressed in terms of our illustration, for there is a property that follows from 
all the cutting points: rectangles formed from their segment pairs are always 
equal to each other, be the exact areas of those rectangles what they may. This 
may be taken to illustrate the way in which, in Spinoza’s ontology, all extended 
things always have a shape and all mental things always involve affirmation (or 
negation), even though the precise nature of these properties varies immensely, 
just as do the areas of different rectangles. Taking all the aforesaid together yields 
what may be called the full layout of the ontological structure of a finite thing, which 
consists of 1) certain causes generating 2) the essence of a thing 3) from which 
necessarily follow a number of properties. All of these find their analogues in the 
illustration: 1) drawing of two lines generates 2) a cutting point so that 3) two 
equal rectangles of a specific area follow.
The illustration can not only help us to understand why and how Spinoza 
considers finite things to be endowed with their individual essences, but it can 
also, in an indirect fashion, throw light on the way in which he sees the onto-
logical status of species universals (or species-essences). Now there are, of course, 
innumerably many ways in which certain points can be demarcated from the 
totality contained in the circle; Figure 1.5 offers one rudimentary example of 
such demarcation.
In Spinoza’s epistemology, this corresponds to forming universal ideas: we can, 
for instance, mark off a certain group of essences (of bodies and minds) from the 
rest of the essences (of physical and mental individuals) based on real features 
they share (bodies can be, for instance, endowed with a similar ratio of motion 
and rest, minds with the capacity to reason) and then classify their bearers under 
a term such as ‘human being’. Now this kind of idea of a species is grounded in 
what really exists, which is arguably why Spinoza is quite happy, despite vehe-
mently criticising imaginatively formed universals (E IIP40S1), to refer to such 
entities as man, horse, and insect.28 However, his basic ontology does not contain 
species-essences that would make things what they are – deep down everything 
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finite is, in its (formal) essence, strictly individual. In terms of the illustration, 
it can be said that the drawing of the lines is uniform in the sense that there is 
no geometrical reason for classifying different kinds of line-drawings and result-
ing cutting points (which would correspond to ontologically robust genera and 
species), even though we can employ different methods to group together points 
based on, for instance, their position in the circle. Likewise, a universal idea, such 
as that of the species ‘human’, is a being of reason (ens rationis), something that 
is ‘in our intellect and not in Nature’ (KV I.10). But this does not mean that it 
could not be a highly useful idea, or that it would have no basis in reality.29
I have argued above that the illustration can help us to see how attributes and 
the (immediate) infinite modes are involved in the generation of finite modes; 
but more is needed to arrive at finite things.30 What is needed, in addition, is 
other finite things: Spinoza famously states that ‘every singular thing, or any 
thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be 
determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an 
effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence’ (E 
IP28).31 I would like to finish this section by considering whether there might be 
a way of finding a place and a role for this idea within the illustration. Stretching 
it a bit, there is the following option: we could think about the drawing of the 
lines and the generation of cutting points being determined from one point to the 
next so that each point determines which point is nearest to it in the order of 
generation; correspondingly, in Spinozistic extension, finite bodies determine 
the specific form or path that motion and rest take so that particular bodies come 
to be generated (and affected).32 However, as the example offers no geometrical 
rationale for this determination and as it is generally difficult, to say the least, to 
place features involving duration into something as atemporal as a geometrical 
figure, I think we should acknowledge that the illustration has here reached its 
limits. Then again, we are to expect only so much from an illustration; as Spinoza 
himself notes, ‘if anyone wishes me to explain this further by an example, I will, 
Figure 1.5 
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of course, not be able to give one which adequately explains what I speak of 
here, since it is unique’ (E IIP8S). But it does not appear completely impossible 
to give, within the framework provided by the example, at least the rudiments of 
an outline of how to understand the way in which finite things are involved in 
generating other finite things, and in determining each other.
Conclusion
To conclude, I would like to sum up the ways in which the present interpretation 
of the key geometrical example can enhance our understanding of Spinoza’s 
thought. First, the illustration depicts the ontological priorities involved – and it 
is of crucial importance that we grasp those priorities, for they structure much of 
Spinoza’s philosophical system. Second, the illustration shows why finite modes 
are not really but only modally distinct entities in their attributes. Third, it can 
throw light on how finite essences – which make things what they are – are 
generated out of such infinite entities as attributes and immediate infinite modes. 
Fourth, it illustrates how to understand the individuality of essences: they are 
slightly but nevertheless precisely different from each other. Fifth, it suggests a 
way in which the mediate infinite mode may be seen as the totality of the formal 
essences of finite things. Sixth, starting from the core features of reality, it illus-
trates the generation/essence/property structure of finite things, which structure 
must be captured by the proper definition of a finite thing. Finally, it suggests why 
Spinoza thinks about (the ideas of) species as he does.
Let us finish by taking a step back and returning to the question concerning 
the status of geometry, and the illustration, for Spinoza. All those ontological 
features find their analogues in the illustration that is, after all, Spinoza’s own. 
Is this just a coincidence? A mere fluke? Or does this tell us something profound 
about the principles operative behind his system-building? No definite answer can 
avoid being conjectural. One suggestion would be that the illustration – together 
with Spinoza’s tendency to present key aspects of his system through geometrical 
 examples – in fact reveals a kind of deep structure of Spinoza’s thought; that 
geometry guides his thinking to the extent that he might well have lifted another 
example from Euclid’s Elements, and the one he ended up choosing merely hap-
pened to suit his purposes particularly well. However, many would no doubt find 
this too bold and object to giving too much weight to observations concerning 
a single example. Whatever one’s stand on the issue happens to be, at least this 
much is certain: the evidence is there, and of the type of clarity Spinoza himself 
celebrates.33
Notes
 1. I am using Curley’s translations.
 2. I will here set aside the much-debated question whether Spinoza is a necessitarian or 
merely a determinist. However, a number of contributions since Garrett (1991) have 
shown that Spinoza endorses necessitarianism; for a recent discussion of the topic, see 
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Jarrett (2009).
 3. It is important to note that, as E IP8S2 states, ‘the true definition of each thing 
neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined’. 
In other words, Spinozistic definitions concern precisely essences or natures of 
things.
 4. Cf. especially: ‘Understand the definite nature, by which the thing is what it is, and 
which cannot in any way be taken from it without destroying it, as it belongs to the 
essence of a mountain to have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a 
valley’ (KV I.1).
 5. See, for example, Marshall (2013: 3).
 6. For more on this, see Viljanen (2011: 149–57).
 7. See, for example, Gueroult (1974: 100–2); Jarrett (1990: 162); Koistinen (1998: 
74–5).
 8. E ID4 states that ‘by attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, 
as constituting its essence’, which has given rise to a perennial debate as to whether 
attributes are only subjective ways of perceiving the substance (see esp. Wolfson 1961 
[1934] I: 142–57) or are objectively constitutive of the substance (see esp. Gueroult 
1968: 428–61). Fortunately, this issue has no bearing on the present interpretation 
and can thus be left aside.
 9. Given the nature of the illustration, it is certainly easier to think of extended than 
thinking substance here, but Spinoza’s point is, of course, meant to be attribute-neutral.
10. Again, I am here leaving aside a traditional topic of discussion and just take Spinoza 
at his word when he clearly implies in Ep. 56 (to Boxel) that there are more attributes 
than the two we are acquainted with.
11. Huenemann (1999: 233, emphasis added). See also Marshall (2008: 74 n.54).
12. For the production of a line, see TIE 108.
13. Spinoza’s doctrine of infinite modes is notoriously difficult; for a recent helpful discus-
sion, see Melamed (2013: ch. 4).
14. Correspondingly, the immediate mode of thought is the ‘absolutely infinite intellect’ 
(Ep. 64 to Schuller). For discussion, see Melamed (2013: 134 n.54).
15. However, as Yitzhak Melamed (2013: 116) points out, according to the Ethics (but 
obviously not the Short Treatise), only infinite modes can follow from infinite modes. 
As a consequence, given that the Ethics is the authoritative work here, something in 
addition to infinite modes must be operative when finite modes are produced through 
an infinite mode; I discuss this topic below.
16. Spinoza famously treats motion together with rest, talking often about motion and 
rest as a package in which ‘rest is certainly not Nothing’ (KV II.21). This issue has no 
bearing on the present interpretation, so I will not attempt to analyse it further; for 
some discussion, see Melamed (2013: 135).
17. Here, of course, we have to assume that lines are drawn only horizontally and ver-
tically, otherwise a point could be drawn in infinite different ways, and so the point 
could be defined in infinitely many different ways.
18. As will become clear in what follows, I regard essences of finite things as individual, 
unique to their possessors; as the useful survey by Martin (2008) shows, this is the 
dominant view in the literature. See also Hübner (2016).
19. I argue for these (not particularly contentious) claims especially in Viljanen (2011: 
23–4; 2014: 264–5). See also Garrett (2009: 285–6).
20. See especially Viljanen (2011: 75).
21. E IIP49S states that we are not to consider ideas ‘as mute pictures on a panel’ because 
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each idea ‘involves an affirmation or negation’. This reveals, I think, what is essential 
to the mind as it actively forms ideas ‘because it is a thinking thing’ (E IID3). Even 
though Spinoza says nothing about this, for systematic reasons the ideas resulting 
from the mind’s essential affirmative activity can be viewed to stand in a certain 
interrelationship with each other just as the parts of our bodies ‘communicate their 
motions to each other in a certain fixed manner’ (E IIA20D).
22. See E IPP22–23. For a discussion of terminology concerning the infinite modes, see 
Melamed (2013: 114–16).
23. For discussion, see Melamed (2013: 134 n.54, 136).
24. This being said, I agree with Melamed (2013: 136) that the issue of mediate infinite 
modes is ‘pretty foggy’. Moreover, my interpretation is not far removed from Melamed’s 
(2013: 136) assessment concerning extension: ‘It thus seems quite plausible that the 
face of the whole universe is indeed this infinite individual that contains all bodies 
as its parts.’ In other words, whereas Melamed sees the face of the whole (extended) 
universe as containing all bodies, I see it as containing all the formal essences of 
bodies.
25. For the purposes of the illustration we can disregard the fact that the sectors of the 
circle mirror each other in a way that produces identical segment pairs.
26. I examine the connection between the Short Treatise and E IID2 in more detail in 
Viljanen (2015: 186–7). For a very helpful recent account of E IID2 and individual 
(or particular) essences, see Hübner (2016: 64–5, 68–9). I discuss below what are 
usually called species-essences.
27. See Ep. 83 to Tschirnhaus for Spinoza’s discussion of whether there are things from 
whose definition only one property can be derived.
28. ‘For example, a horse is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if it is changed 
into an insect’ (E IVPref.).
29. This view of universal ideas and species-essences squares very well with, and lends 
some additional support to, the recent account presented by Karolina Hübner. She 
sums up her interpretation as follows: ‘(i) only particulars and their essences have 
formal reality; (ii) the essences of such actually-existing particulars are unique; how-
ever (iii) Spinoza’s metaphysics also allows for more general species-essences; (iv) 
such species-essences are only insofar as they constitute ways that finite minds spon-
taneously think of certain genuinely similar particulars as the same in some respect, 
when they abstract and compare their properties’ (Hübner 2016: 74). To my mind, 
this is basically right, and in fact considerably less speculative than Hübner (2016: 
80) herself thinks.
30. See note 15 above.
31. As E IP11S states, finite things ‘come to be from external causes’; for discussion, see 
Viljanen (2011: 71).
32. The order of generation is temporal in character, so how could temporal features be 
related to the illustration? The determinations between points would (somehow) 
need to be convertible into determinations of time and place, through which dura-
tional existence – a causal process unfolding in time – could come to be formed (see 
also Marshall 2008: 74; Viljanen 2014: 268). This would mean that interdetermina-
tions of formal essences determine the nature (time and place, and thus duration) of 
actual existence. However, not even the third kind of (intuitive) knowledge captures 
this; as the young Spinoza states, ‘it would be impossible for human weakness to grasp 
the series of singular, changeable things’ (TIE 100).
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